Recent progress in cognitive computing suggests that we m i g h t approach the point when the algorithmic principles of brain{like computing will be revealed and the study, design and realization of thinking machines will start to be an issue in computer science. For this purpose, we shall present a brief overview of related results from a machine oriented complexity theory.
Introduction
In 1950, in his seminal work Computing Machinery and Intelligence 20] A. M. Turing wrote: I believe that in about fty years' time it will be possible to program computers, with a storage capacity of about 10 9 to make them play an imitation game 2 so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70% chance of making the right identi cation after ve minutes of questioning. The original question,`Can a machine think?' I believe to be too meaningless to deserve discussion. Nevertheless I believe that at the end of century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machine thinking without expecting to be contradicted".
While with his estimate of the storage capacity o f t o d a y's computers Turing was astonishingly right, it appears that his further guess concerning the time when machine intelligence will become a reality w as too optimistic. Sure, nowadays hardly anyone in computer science, arti cial intelligence and related sciences doubts that in principle machines can think, in some form. At the same time, we d o n o t k n o w o f a n y m a c hine that would have passed Turing's test. Thus, the real issue is, whether at the present time machines can already think, and if yes, then how. I.e., do we h a ve plausible arguments leading to the design of thinking machines?
It is the goal of this paper to present the known facts supporting the above arguments from the viewpoint of computer science.
In computer science the main approach to the problem of cognition, thinking, or intelligence in general, is to see these activities as a large scale interactive information processing phenomenon supported by a large scale computational machinery.
In understanding this complex task, nature has confronted us with di erent roadblocks, which in their variety and entirety, h a ve not been challenged successfully either in computer science, or in any other science. The nature of the above m e n tioned barriers is diverse. To o vercome them one would ideally like to at least see a kind of three level model of cognitive systems similar to the case of any abstract or formal computational system (cf. 29]).
At the highest \machine independent" level it is necessary to have some kind of functional speci cations stating at a fairly high level (but as formally as possible, and as completely as possible) what kind of cognitive information{processing tasks will be performed and how they should interact. Informally and partially this is described as \higher brain functions" in other disciplines like cognitive psychology. It seems that intelligence cannot be captured entirely in the language of logic and that some non{logical calculus of interaction is required (see 26] for an interesting discussion).
Then, at the next lower level, one would need a more re ned model dealing with only several basic cognitive operations out of which more complex mental operations on the previous level can be built. It is perhaps here where computer science can help in identifying this elementary set of mind operations. Of course, other sciences, like psychology and neurobiology can o er valuable guidance in this search.
Finally, one needs a plausible \machine" model of a brain in which t h e b a s i c m i n d operations can be realized e ciently. Here again neurobiology and neuroanatomy, together with machine oriented complexity theory and arti cial intelligence, can be of tremendous help.
No satisfactory speci cations of any of the above m e n tioned three levels are known. It appears that a collaboration of all of the above m e n tioned branches of science are necessary needed in order to cope with the related problems 3 . A t the border of all of these disciplines, a new discipline of computer science seems to have emerged that may be appropriately called cognitive computing 24] .
Roughly speaking, each cognitive computational model, that we shall deal with in the sequel, will concentrate on a di erent l e v el or on di erent l e v els with a various intensity of details, in the above mentioned sketch of a three level architecture of cognitive systems. In all cases there will be at least some loose reference to the remaining levels.
The survey is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we shall introduce a simplistic view of the brain as an interactive machine, or transducer. This view is common to all approaches included in this overview.
Then, in Section 3 we shall describe a family of the simplest models of a brain, viz. that of nite neural nets.
In the next four sections we shall present a model called neuroidal tabula rasa by V aliant 22], Goldschlager's model of memory surface from 7] , then the brain as a molecular computer by de Bruijn 4] and we shall end with the recent model of cogitoids by the present author 30].
In Section 8 we shall brie y discuss anew the previous models in order to uncover their bottlenecks and superiorities and we shall nally try to answer the question whether thinking machines can be built at the present t i m e .
As a suitable expository reading of results related to brains, machines, mathematics and computer science the books 1], 2], 6], and 14] are to be recommended.
Brains as Interactive M a c hines
The proper and the most general formal devices for describing cognitive activities seem to be interactive machines (cf. 26], 27]) whose task is to cope e ectively with their environment b y means of interaction. Incrementally they process in nite streams of input information supplied by the environment and produce similar streams of output information that is interpreted as the behaviour of machines. Since each increment to a previous input to such a m a c hine may present a reaction of its environment t o the machine's previous behaviour, such machines really allow for modeling interaction between them and their environment.
It is assumed that the streams of input data are produced by some preprocessors that, in practice, may themselves be a part of the brain. These preprocessors process the data obtained by sensors into an encrypted, possibly simpli ed, form that is more suitable to be processed by t h e i n teractive m a c hine itself. Similar situation also holds for output streams that are sent to postprocessors whose task is to decrypt data and instruct e ectors appropriately.
By processing further parts of a potentially in nite input stream, the interactive machine is allowed to change its internal structure | so to speak to re{program itself repeatedly and to store some useful derived data | in order to learn from the past.
An important feature of our interactive model is that in many cases it cannot obtain the input data on its input ports \on demand" | rather, only when the data is available, when it is \o ered" by the environment, or when it is spotted by the machine. Thus, the device works asynchronously with its environment and is at least partially input driven. Timing, i.e., data arrival time from individual preprocessors also plays a crucial role: it appears that in more elaborated models of cognition simultaneous or ensuing appearance of data is of vital importance for learning from experience.
By modeling the cognitive activities of the brain by using the interactive m a c hine of the above m e n tioned kind, one in principle obtains a more powerful computational and descriptional tool than presented by standard Turing machines that only operate over inputs of nite length (cf. 27]).
Neural Nets
We shall begin our overview on models for cognitive computing with the simplest devices that are inspired by our ideas on how real biological brains work. The respective models are presented by v arious kinds of neural nets that di er in the realization of their various types of basic computational elements | arti cial neurons.
In general, a neuron is a device that is able to compute values of a function f : S n ! T in a single computational step. Individual sorts of neurons di er from each other by t h e c hoice of function f (inclusively its domain and range). The elements x 2 S n are called inputs while the elements y 2 T are called outputs.
By using the outputs of some neurons in the place of inputs to other neurons we get a so{called neural net. The topology of the resulting net can be appropriately depicted with the help of an oriented graph in which neurons are its nodes, incoming edges denote the inputs to the neurons and outcoming edges denote the outputs from the neurons.
Any nite neural net can be seen as an interactive m a c hine in the following way. Inputs that are not connected to the outputs of some neurons can be interpreted as input ports while outputs that are not connected to the inputs of some neurons present output ports of the net. All neurons in the net work synchronously. A t the beginning of a computation the output values of all neurons are set to some prescribed values. Then, at each time step each neuron reads its inputs and computes its output according to its de nition. Especially, at each computational step the net reads symbols, appearing at each input port, and sends one symbol to each output port.
Besides its topology the computational power of a neural net depends crucially on the nature of function f computed by the individual neurons. Therefore the computa-tional power of each net must be investigated for each speci c instance of f separately.
The In order to intuit the computational power and limits of nite neural nets of a rst generation, the simplest case of single input port nets has been studied in the framework of formal languages and complexity t h e o r y . In the respective model, the input stream is read bit by bit and with a possible delay a stream of 1s or 0s indicating whether the input sequence, read so far, is accepted, is produced at the output. The respective nets are called neuromata. They have been studied intensively in works 18] and 19]. The respective results point to the fact that such devices have the computational power equivalent to that of nite automata | i.e., they recognize regular languages.
Second generation neurons (also called analog neurons) di er from the rst generation by w orking over domains of real inputs and outputs. The biological motivation (that in practice seems to hold only partially) is that ring neurons produce electrical pulses with an intensity t h a t v aries in a certain range. This is modeled by the respective v ariables that take o n c o n tinuous real values, and hence the neuron computes the values of some real function. This is achieved by applying a so{called activation function : R ! R to the weighted sum of inputs to the neuron at hand. The output value is, then, also a real number. Thus, if y k is the input to i from a neuron that is connected to i via the edge (k i) 2 E, carrying the weight w ki , then the output y i of i is de ned as y i = (
Depending on the activation function (that can be e.g. a sigmoidal function, or linear saturated function, or piecewise polynomial function) and on the weights (that can either be integers, or rationals, or reals), the computational power of the respective nets has a range rom that of the rst generation (regular languages) up to super{ From a biological point of view networks computing with reals are unrealistic | no biological system seems to be able to cope with analog values to an arbitrary precision. The above belief has recently obtained an unexpected support by the theory | in 11] it has been shown that the presence of arbitrarily small amounts of analog noise reduces the power of analog neural nets, and even the power of the the third generation (see in the sequel), to the power of the rst generation networks (i.e., essentially to that of nite automata). This excludes the possibility that biological systems could possess the super{Turing computational capabilities.
Third generation neural nets are based on the model of spiking neurons that seem to better correspond to the computation of biological neural systems that employ pulses in order to transmit information among their computational units (i.e., neurons).
Whereas the timing was trivialized in both preceding generations (by assuming synchronousness in most of the cases), the timing of individual computational steps plays a key role for computations in networks of spiking neurons. In fact, the output of a spiking neuron v consists of the set (cf. 10]) Thus, the neurons transmit information by e n c o d i n g i t i n to gaps among successive rings. For details see e.g. the paper by Maass 10] where the computational power of spiking neuron networks is investigated and compared with that of preceding generations. It is shown that these nets are computationally more powerful than the other neural net models. A concrete, biologically relevant function is exhibited which c a n b e computed by a single spiking neuron, but which requires hundreds of hidden units on a sigmoidal neural net of the second generation. A recent o verview on the computational power of a pulse computation can be found in 12] .
By devising and investigating increasingly more faithful models of biological neurons we are hopefully approaching the true computational e ciency of real brains. Unfortunately, unless some major computational feature of real neurons has been overlooked, it appears that no matter how faithfully we shall be able to simulate the activity of real neurons this e ort is not going to substantially contribute to our quest for discovering the basic high level principles by w h i c h the mind works.
To summarize the computational power of neural nets from the point o f v i e w o f complexity theory, the realistic models among them have equal power as the rst generation nets. They di er merely in the e ciency of the respective devices: for the same computational task there may exist networks of a higher generation which are smaller than the networks of the lower generation.
In the framework of cognitive computing, the previous results can be interpreted as ones expressing that neural nets present e cient devices that can realize the basic cognitive task of pattern recognition, or an associative retrieval of them, with complexity c haracteristics, depending on the size and number of recognized patterns and on the computational power of individual neurons. The patterns are represented as nite segments of otherwise in nite input streams.
Neural Tabula Rasa
The main feature that seems to be missing in the previous neural net models is the ability to learn. The main obstacle, in this sense, seems to be the fact that these nets, once de ned, cannot modify their computational behaviour. This appears to be a condition sine qua non for any learning device. This defect is eliminated in so{ called neuroidal nets that present a programmable type of neural nets, which w as rst proposed by V aliant in 1988 21] . The potential to model brain{like computations was further investigated in 1994 in the monograph 22], by the same author, and nally a neuroidal architecture for cognitive computation has been recently proposed in 25] .
The main building element of neuroidal networks is a neuroid which i s a c o m bination of a neural threshold element (of the rst generation) with the idea of a nite automaton and additional features that enable a neuroid to change its state, weights, and/or threshold depending on the activities of neighbouring connecting neuroids and current values of previous parameters. The idea that real neurons can store information not only in the synaptic strength (which is modeled by the respective w eights) but also as state information is biologically plausible and experimentally con rmed 25].
The rules for changing respective parameters are formally described with the help of a transition function, similarly as it is the case of nite automata. readily, this enables the programming of individual neuroids (or more often: groups of neurons) to behave di erently at di erent times.
E.g., one can design a single neuroid that, once \seeing" a certain input which contains at least one 1 will re in the future i it will be again confronted with a similar input. Such a similar input should have ones in the same places as the original input (and possibly in other places). Initially, the respective neuroid has all its weights set to 1. When confronted with an input consisting of k 1 ones, it resets the weights at ports containing zero to 0 and its threshold to k. T h e n i t e n ters into a \ nal" state in which no further parameter changes are performed any longer.
In this way one can program neuroids to implement v arious atomic cognitive tasks. Connecting neuroids in a net gives rise to a so{called neuroidal tabula rasa (NTR).
The most important task of NTR is its ability to represent v arious semantic items x 1 : : : x t which describe any aspect of the modeled reality. E a c h item is represented by a group of neuroids that re under certain conditions on the inputs or internal computations corresponding to the moment when the NTR is somehow \reminded" of the item. The size of the group is called a replication factor and it must be chosen appropriately in order to ensure that the following NTR operations will work e ciently with a high probability (see the sequel).
By programming the neuroids accordingly, on its existing knowledge base of represented items the NTR is able to build further items hierarchically by using the following operations in any order:
1. allocating new neuroids to represent new items 2. memorizing a new item x t+1 = x i^xj (1 i < j t) in the sense that x t+1 will re at later times whenever both x i and x j re (but not under other conditions) 3. associating x i with x j in the sense that x i will re whenever x j res 4. detect correlations between pairs x i x j that re simultaneously 5. do each o f t h e a b o ve operations with relational or multi{object expressiveness rather than propositionally. The respective operations are realized with the help of the so{called vicinal algorithms. They are probabilistic algorithms. Their most basic feature is that whenever communication is to be established between two items, not directly connected in the NTR, the algorithms establish the necessary connection via neuroids that are connected to both items. These neuroids are called the frontier of both items. Such a f r o n tier, with the replication factor r, should exist with a high probability for any t wo randomly chosen groups of neuroids, with about the same replication factor r, representing two di erent items. This alone imposes a certain condition on the topology of the graph underlying the NTR.
Besides the frontier properties, there is a further attribute that is required of the NTR and can be supplied by randomness. This further property is needed to ensure that the nodes chosen for representation of a new item will be, to a large measure, among those not previously chosen. Valiant calls this the hashing property since it corresponds to that notion in computer science. The corresponding theory is related to some extent to the problem of universal hashing.
These two properties jointly are ful lled e.g. in the class of random graphs on N nodes with the expected degree where also the discussion of other cognitive tasks (e.g., memorization, correlational learning, relation expression learning, reasoning) can be found. Unfortunately, the resulting model of brain{like computations tends to be quite complex and it appears to be di cult to cope with e.g. higher brain functions more rigorously within this framework.
Further Valiant's elaboration of related issues in cognitive computing and the architecture of the respective systems can be found in 23], 24], and 25].
Memory Surface Model
Memory surface model by L. Goldschlager 7] appeared untimely in 1984 when the interest in cognitive computing in computer science wa s n o t a s h i g h a s n o wadays. From today's perspective this model seems to be of upmost interest since it provides the rst coherent view on brain operations from a computational, or algorithmic point of view.
The model can be viewed as a directed graph comprised of millions of points, which will be called columns. The graph is to be seen in the three-dimensional Euclidean space and therefore it makes sense to speak about the distance of its nodes and the direction of its edges. Each column is connected to a number of other columns nearby a n d n o long distance connections are required. The connection between coincident columns are in both directions. Moreover, columns may h a ve (directed, one way) connections from some pre{processing and/or to some post{processing components. There is a weight m d assigned to each outcoming edge (indexed by) d.
Columns present the basic functional unit of memory surface. All communication among columns and pre{ and post{processors will be in the form of trains of pulses running along the directed edges of the underlying graph. These pulses have the same shape and amplitude, but their frequency can vary with time.
The computational activity of each column is fully described by the following rules:
whenever a pulse arrives at the column along some edge it behaves as if it is travelling in a straight line through the column, providing that the edges are more or less evenly spaced around the column the number of pulses arriving at the column along all incoming edges will be summed over a short time period. If the column happens to have a connection from the pre{processor, the pulses arriving along that connection will also be added into the overall sum of arriving pulses, but with a higher weighting factor. then a pulse train will be produced, whose instantaneous frequency f, called the activity of the column, is proportional to the value of the sum. This pulse train is further transmitted with the unchanged instantaneous frequency f to the post{processor, if there is such a connection, and with frequency m d f along each outcoming edge d. the mechanism, which sums the incoming pulses to the columns, will exhibit short term habituation. That is, if the sum is repeatedly large for a long time thus giving rise to a large value of f, then the mechanism will tire and begin reducing the value of f. Conversely, after a period of time when the sum is repeatedly low, the habituation or tiredness will slowly wear o . The habituation may only last a fraction of a second for any edge d, whenever a pulse arrives from that direction, m d will be incremented slightly, provided that f exceeds a certain value at the time the pulse arrives The function of each column, as described above, can be implemented i n a v ariety of ways and the way of implementation is not essential for further explanation. Nevertheless, for the sake of plausibility, Goldschlager sketches column implementation with the help of a model of some variant of \spiking neurons" (see Section 3) which, however, are not speci ed in su cient details that would enable a more rigorous treatment of the proposed implementation.
De ne a pattern P t o b e a n y set of columns, together with their relative activities. Many of these activities will be zero, representing the fact that the corresponding column does not participate in this particular pattern, and many will be non{zero, thus representing an important part of the pattern. In practice, each pattern will
The simplest patterns which correspond to the least abstract or most fundamental concepts, which the brain can handle are just those patterns which result from some combination of receptors ring in response to some actual events occurring in the environment of the brain. Symmetrically, those patterns which cause e ectors to produce some useful impact on the environment, are also among the simplest patterns.
The basic mechanism that causes various new and old patterns to emerge, with various activities, is that of the simultaneous excitation of the respective columns. Namely, when these columns are simultaneously excited by pulses coming from other active columns, or from pre{processors, to such a degree that they re, the new patterns become active. Moreover, the outcoming pulses will cause the increase of weights of corresponding edges, memorizing thus the patterns with increased strength. Also, the pulses will arrive at post{processors causing some appropriate action of e ectors. Due to their habituation, the patterns that caused the activation of new patterns will slowly decay while the newly activated ones will survive for a while.
In this way the memory surface works as an interactive m a c hine.
The process just described is also responsible for memory surface learning of correlations among often simultaneously excited patterns. These correlations take the form of associations established among those patterns via edges with increased weight. New concepts emerge by association of simpler concepts, which are related by contiguity i n time or place, cause and e ect, and by resemblance.
Contiguity in place refers to the fact that when objects are often observed to be physically together, they become associated. The frequent s i m ultaneous observation of the objects will cause the patterns on the memory surface, which represent these objects, to be simultaneously active for a long total duration.
Contiguity in time refers to the fact that when events often occur in a sequence over time, those events will become associated. Examples are remembering a song and learning the alphabet. E.g., in the latter case, as soon as the concept (of a symbol) A becomes active, its columns will tend to stimulate each other and thus the pattern will persist on a memory surface for some time. However, due to habituation, the strength of the pattern will decrease with time. By the time the concept B becomes active, it will be simultaneous with the weaker strength pattern A. Therefore an association of A with B will be formed by the standard association mechanism. And so on with the next members of the sequence. This, by t h e w ay, e x p l a i n s w h y sequences, which are learned in one direction, are hard to recall in the reverse direction.
Cause and e ect is to be understood as a special case of sequence. When two concepts share some common set of features, they resemble one another. Hence, due to the very nature of an associating mechanism, two di erent concepts with a common set of features will have associative links to this set of features, even if the patterns representing the two concepts were never present simultaneously. Clearly, at the same time, the set of common features of two or more concepts presents an abstraction, or a generalization of the concepts involved.
With the help of the above mentioned mechanisms one can also explain the func-tioning of higher brain functions. For instance, how does a brain progress from one thought to another? Here a mechanism, similar to one causing the association of members of some sequence, is in action. At a n y moment of time, some sets of patterns will be active h a ving various strength on the memory surface. Each of these patterns will tend to excite all the patterns, to which it is associated, with strength proportional to its own strength and to the strength (weights) of the associative links. Meanwhile, the currently active patterns will tend to habituate and their strength will die away.
So the memory surface will exhibit a ow of activity from concepts to associated concepts which w e perceive a s train of thoughts.
Creativity consists of a lucky, so far unprecedented simultaneous activation of two patterns with many features in common. In this way a new, so{far \unknown", abstract concept will be invoked. The luck m a y b e p r o vided by the external environment, or by a random stimulation in sleep. Sleep has two survival phases, namely to help the memory of infrequently used concepts and associations, and to encourage creativity.
The concept of self is a collection of various concepts that are all related to activities directly controlled by memory surface.
Consciousness is a complex of di erent concepts that all relate to the idea of awareness.
Awareness of environment is simply the activation of the appropriate concepts, of the memory surface which model that aspect of the environment. Self{awareness refers to the fact that, in addition to the awareness concept, the concept of self is simultaneously active on the memory surface. Finally, awareness on one's own train of thought, often called introspection, means forming an association between the concept of self and the other concepts currently active on the memory surface.
Conscious thoughts can be regarded as those patterns which are active simultaneously with the concept of self, and whose associations are su ciently strong to form an association with the concept of self. Unconscious thoughts are those which are active when the concept of self does not happen to be active, and those patterns where activity i s t o o w eak to form an association with the concept of self.
Brain as a Molecular Computer
The next model that we are going to present originates from a series of papers by de Bruijn 3], 4], and 5]. After Turing, during the nineteen seventies de Bruijn was apparently one of the rst pioneers in mathematics and computer science who paid serious attention to problems related to mathematical brain modeling.
His model is quite di erent from previous ones: it is not based on the preceding ideas of seeing the brain as a set of relatively simple, neuron{like computing elements connected by a xed communication network.
The model can be seen as a gigantic spatially distributed parallel computer with tiny processors, equipped with sizable associative memories w orking at a molecular level, that only communicate with pre{ and post{processors in a completely unpredictable way.
Within the framework of interactive m a c hines, the operational view of the model is as follows: the pre{processors are broadcasting a potentially in nite stream of primitive signals p 1 p 2 : : :during the whole life of the system. On the other hand, they also often broadcast a query in which they are giving a signal they broadcasted in the past and are asking for the signal which i m m e diately followed. The model should be able to record the stream and to answer those queries in a real{time manner. As one could expect, the basic mechanism used for answering the queries is that of associative retrieval.
This mechanism is implemented in processors whose role is played by cells. Each cell is seen as a bowl containing a large, but xed number of compounds A B C : : : : Hence, the number of reactions that can ever take place in the bowl is nite. In their simplest form the reactions are of the form A+B ! C: This is not necessarily a faithful description of a chemical reaction rather, it should describe the fact that adding A and B to the existing mixture in the bowl will produce C.
The bowl can then act as a huge parallel computer, with di erent As a n d Bs which represent inputs to some operations, and Cs the outputs, and with the whole computation performed with the help of reactions of the above m e n tioned type. This is why De Bruijn calls the respective mixture a thinking soup. If one thinks of DNA{like molecules of the length k then the number of possible compounds may be of the order c k with a constant c > 1. This \molecular hardware" is potentially available, but most of it is never used.
Operating with such a thinking soup requires inputs and outputs. Inputs do not necessarily need to consist of chemical ingredients inserted into the bowl at the beginning of its computations. There may be other phenomena, like electric or mechanical signals that initiate the production of particular compounds. Similarly, the outputs might include sensors that transform chemical information into other kinds of signals. So, according to de Bruijn, an input and output should be called an active a n d p a s s i v e smelling.
It is quite possible that a thinking soup helps biological system to think, along with neural networks, but de Bruijn does not seem to be able to provide any plausible explanations of such a phenomenon. Rather, he provides an interesting proposal of how the associative memory can be handled in the thinking soup.
Add an input p to the thinking soup, followed immediately by the signal q. These inputs generate compounds A and B in the soup. Let these compounds generate a third compound, C: A + B ! C. Assume that there are mechanisms that restrict this reaction to the case where A is followed by B and not vice versa, and that this is the only way h o w C can appear in the bowl. Further, let the compound C be quite stable, and let it survive e v en after A and B have v anished completely. Then the whole process A + B ! C can be seen as an information storage and the respective reaction might be appropriately called a storage reaction.
In order to obtain memory retrieval, one should assume that there is a companion, the so{called retrieval reaction A + C ! B. It has the e ect that if p should ever reappear producing A, then C subsequently helps to produce B the result is that q is obtained as the output. Of course one has to assume that A did not already trigger the retrieval reaction at the time of storage reaction: perhaps when C was formed, A was entirely consumed by this reaction, or was too weak to trigger the retrieval reaction.
Every brain cell and, indeed, any cell in principle (think of unicellular organisms) may be able to record many thousands of di erent associations in this way.
In order to explain how one could compute by using the thinking soup within cells, one has to return to the operational view of the model mentioned above. Assume preprocessors are continuously broadcasting a potentially in nite sequence of primitive signals. In the case that the respective signal has not been memorized yet in the cell, it gets memorized in the cell's thinking soup with the help of a storage reaction. Otherwise, the signal is interpreted as a query whose answer is retrieved with the help of retrieval operations and sent further to postprocessors.
Such an arrangement has a major drawback: the same information gets redundantly stored in each a n d e v ery cell and therefore sooner or later the capacity of the systems will become exhausted. What is needed, is a mechanism that would store the items with signi cantly less redundancy in order to make better use of full storage capacity available in all cells.
To s o l v e this problem de Bruijn o ers an ingenious solution: at every moment not every cell is active and is ready to perform store or retrieve operations. The periods of activity of each cell are randomly chosen. Under such a scenario, signals only get stored into, or queries are only performed over, the set of currently active cells that is called active window. Since this is a continuously varying set deBruijn calls it \roaming random set". It is clear that by decreasing the size of the active window the storage capacity of the system increases while its retrieval reliability decreases. This is because some previously stored information does not need to reside in the cells of a current roaming random set and therefore a query asking for that particular information cannot be answered.
Here we are confronted with a nice optimization problem: what should be the size of a randomly chosen active w i n d o w in order to guarantee, with a high probability, that there will be at least one cell from any window that was active in the past? The To nish the description of de Bruijn's molecular computer two questions must be answered. What is the mechanism that implements broadcasting of signals among pre{processors, cells, and post{processors, and how do the cells determine when to be active and when to take a rest?
For both purposes the same mechanism can be envisaged. Namely, it is biologically plausible that not only are the neurons in the brain connected randomly via their dendrites, but moreover, the places where they \touch" each other can also be randomly set \on" or \o " for signal transmission in both directions. Some of the neurons are connected to pre{processing parts of the brain. From here, primitive signals are broadcasted along the connections that are at this very moment \on", essentially to a randomly chosen set of cells. This collection of cells is the active window o f t h e moment. It is assumed that the topology of the underlying graph is such that the signals can arrive a t a n y cell after only a few steps between the cells.
Besides the enormous storage capacity, de Bruijn sees the main advantage of his model in the fact that within its framework one is able to explain consciousness and unconsciousness.
These two notions are to be understood as particular modes of interaction between pre and post{processors and the memory. This interaction takes place in the active window. The information owing from pre{processors is immediately stored in the cells of the active window where it remains very easily available during the decay period. During that period the pre and post{processors might repeatedly recall the stored memory items | \thoughts", a n d t o think about them. This is called re ection. During the short decay period they can be recalled, and new thoughts can be formed about them and stored. All this has to be done within the decay period for otherwise the information is much harder to get.
In the course of the above m e n tioned process there may be a considerable tra c between pre{processors and the cells of the roaming random set, and between the latter and the post{processors. But it may v ery well happen that only a small part of the cells from the active window i s i n volved in the re ection. De Bruijn calls this part the conscious part, and all the rest the unconscious part. There is no sharp borderline between the two.
For more arguments in favor of the above m e n tioned model see 3] and 5].
Cogitoids
Unlike in all of the previous cases, forget about the \machine" model of the brain now. Let us concentrate instead on the intended brain functions at the middle level of the three level architecture of a cognitive information processing system mentioned in Section 1. Building on Goldschlager's ideas the respective approach w as taken in 30]. The idea here was to consider the basic cognitive e n tities (concepts) and operations above them (such as forming of new concepts and associations among them) as the basic properties of the model. They are there and we do not care about how they are realized.
The resulting formal model of a cogitoid looks as follows. The basic entity it handles are the concepts. They are modeled by subsets of a Especially, for any A and B A B is a concretization of either A or B while A \ B is their abstraction. Note that the set of all concepts over U with operations of set union and set intersection form a Boolean algebra with being its least element and U its greatest element.
With the help of the above mentioned two operations of concept union and intersection, new concepts can be formed from existing ones.
In a cogitoid, concepts may be explicitly related via associations. Associations emerge among concepts that occur in series or among similar concepts. 4 Formally, a n ordered pair of form (A B) of concepts is called an association, denoted also as A ! B.
We s a y t h a t A is associated with B:There are two t ypes of associations: excitatory and inhibitory. Among any pair of concepts there may be both types of associations.
Two concepts A and B resemble each other in the concept C i A \ B = C and C 6 = : This knowledge is also represented as an association A ! B:
At a n y time t any concept may be either present or absent in a cogitoid. If present, then a concept may be either in an active or in a passive state.
Also, at each time t there are two q u a n tities assigned to each concept: its strength and its quality. The strength of a present concept is always a non{negative i n teger while absent concepts have the strength zero. The quality of concepts can be positive, negative, or unde ned. Positive a ects have a l w ays positive q u a l i t y, while negative a ects have always negative quality. The quality of other concepts may be arbitrary and depends on the history of concept formation or on the context in which a concept is invoked (activated).
Similarly, the strength is also assigned to each excitatory or inhibitory association. Currently passive concepts may be activated either directly from the environment (via external stimuli that activate the corresponding features), or by i n ternal stimuli via associations from other active concepts.
In the latter case, in order to activate, concepts should be su ciently excited. The concepts get excited via associations. The strength of excitation depends on the strength and type of all associations leading from active concepts to the concept at hand. This concept is excited to the level that is proportional to the sum of strengths of all excitatory associations from currently active concepts decreased by the sum of strengths of all inhibitory associations from currently active concepts.
The cogitoid is seen as an interactive transducer that reads an in nite sequence of Boolean vectors of form (x 1 x 2 : : : x n ). Each s u c h a v ector denotes an instance of a concept I that is determined by those features that correspond to ones in the above vector. The concept I represents an object that is \observed" by a cogitoid at its input.
The computation of C proceeds in rounds. At the end of each round a set of concepts is active. This set presents an output of the cogitoid | its behaviour, its reaction to the previous input. Let A t be the set of concepts active at the end of the t{th computational round in a cogitoid C:
Each round consists of six phases:
Phase 1: Producing the output and reading the input: The concepts in A t are sent to the output. All concepts in the set I = fXjX Ig corresponding to all abstrac-tions of I are activated. This models the formation of concepts by their simultaneous appearance.
Phase 2: Activating new concepts by internal stimuli: First a single new concept N from among all currently passive concepts gets activated. This is done with the help of a selection mechanism which inspects the excitation of all currently passive concepts from concepts in I A t and subsequently activates the most excited concept N.
Simultaneously with activating N also the set N of all abstractions of N gets activated.
Phase 3: Assigning quality to concepts. The quality of a ects is constant all the time and it will determine the quality of all other currently active concepts to which active a ects are related. The concepts whose quality cannot be determined by the preceding rule, get unde ned quality.
Phase 4: Long{term memorization: The strength of all currently activated concepts is increased by a small amount.
Similarly, the strength of associations between each concept in the set A t and each in N is increased. This models the emergence of associations by cause and e ect. In the above mentioned process, if the association to be strengthened is between the concepts A and B, then if the quality o f A was positive or negative or unde ned, respectively, then the excitatory or inhibitory association, or both associations, respectively, between A and B are strengthened.
Note that increasing the strength of associations in some cases means that new associations are established (since until that time associations can be seen as those with strength zero). Phase 6: Deactivation: The concepts in the set A t are deactivated and the set N becomes the set of all active concepts A t+1 :
Note that the sequence fA t g t 0 models the \train of thoughts" in our cogitoid.
The notion of the above described cogitoid can be formalized with the help of sets and mappings.
In 30] it is shown that for any cogitoids it is possible to perform basic cognitive tasks such as abstraction formation, associative retrieval, causality learning, retrieval by causality, and similarity{based behaviour.
The next domain of behaviour that can be acquired by cogitoids is that of Pavlovian conditioning. This is a phenomenon in which an animal can be conditioned (learned) to activate a concept as a response to an apparently unrelated stimulating concept (cf. 22], p. 217).
For instance, one may rst \train" a cogitoid to establish a strong association S ! R: Then, we m a y repeatedly confront s u c h a cogitoid with a further, so far unseen concept A with A \ S = that is present e d t o i t j o i n tly with S as S A:
After a while we shall observe t h a t A alone will elicit the response R: Nevertheless, after a few of such \ c heating" from our side the cogitoid will abstain from eliciting R when seeing merely A (in psychology this is called extinction). Also more complicated instances of Pavlovian conditioning can be observed in arbitrary cogitoids. The only condition is that the cogitoids must be large enough to accommodate all the necessary concepts. In order to explain Pavlovian conditioning no use of negative operant concepts and related inhibitory associations are necessary.
Cogitoids are also able to realize so{called operant behaviour. This is a behaviour acquired, shaped, and maintained by s t i m uli occurring after the responses rather than before. Thus, the invocation of a certain response concept R is con rmed as a \good one" (by i n voking the positive o p e r a n t concept P) or \bad one" (the negative operant concept N) only after R has been invoked. It is the reward (P), or punishment ( N) that act to enhance the likelihood of R being re{invoked under similar circumstances as before.
The real problem here is hidden in the last statement w h i c h s a ys that R should be re{invoked (or not re{invoked) only under similar circumstances as before. Thus, inhibition, or excitation of R must not depend on S alone: in some contexts, R should be inhibited, and in others, excited. Such a context is called an operant context i t i s represented by a concept that appears invariantly as the part of the input of a cogitoid during the circumstances at hand. Thanks to cogitoid learning abilities, this operant context gets tied to the respective operant concept which, later on, causes that all associations emerging from this pair will inherit the quality of the operand concept at hand. Therefore, in the future, these associations will inhibit or excite R as necessary.
It appears that by a similar mechanism that ties a certain operant concept to some temporarily prevailing operant context one can also explain a more complicated case of the so{called delayed r einforcing when the reinforcing stimulus | a punishment o r a r e w ard | does not necessarily appear immediately after the step that will be reinforced.
All of the latter statements concerning the learning abilities of cogitoids can be formalized and rigorously proven (see the original paper 30]).
In the forthcoming paper 31] it is further shown in a kind of a thought e x p e r i m e n t that when a cogitoid is exposed to a similar sequence of inputs as the human brain during its existence speci c substructures start to develop in a cogitoid's memory. These structures correspond to episodic memories, frames for frequently performed activities, roles to be played by di erent objects in di erent contexts, attentional mechanisms for di erent c o n texts, and to habits. The latter represent the executive part of cogitoids memory. Within this framework language acquisition and generation can also be explained. Eventually, an emergence of behaviour, which resembles the behaviour which originates in the human mind, is to be expected.
Afterthoughts
We h a ve seen several models of cognitive computing that to various extents can be thought of as certain computational approximations of abilities of human minds. It is the ability of the cognitive models to algorithmically support or explain various mental phenomena as observed in experimental psychology that makes these models plausible.
It appears that from this point of view the simplest of these models | neural nets | can serve at best as a \cognitive substrate" for the implementation of more sophisticated models that deal with more advanced mental phenomena. Essentially, this was also the case with the molecular model that deals with a level of abstraction which i s t o o l o w.
The addition of explicit learning abilities, which w as the case with neuroidal nets, boosts the respective devices into a higher cognitive category. Nevertheless, the problem of a reasonable explanation of higher cognitive functions remains since the abstraction distance to be mastered, when speaking about their realization in terms of neuron rings, seems to be too great. Goldschlager's model of memory surface seems to be the rst one that liberated itself from a total dependence on a machine model and concentrated instead onto the mental entities | concepts | that are, as we believe, dealt with in our brains. This has immediately opened ways to more convincing computational theories of mind. It was only Goldschlager's insu cient level of formalization (and perhaps the absence of inhibitive mechanisms) that prevents in formulating and proving the respective theorems about cognitive abilities of the underlying model. Therefore, thanks mainly to its mathematical treatment the model of cogitoids seems to be so far the only model that can pass the tests of explaining basic mental phenomena (such a s P avlovian conditioning or reinforcement learning) in a way t h a t i s usual in computer science. This model has provably a spontaneous ability o f c o n tinuous learning. It presents thus a kind of universal learning machine that detects certain time{, space{, and similarity related patterns in the observed streams of data and learns the appropriate behaviour mostly by rehearsal and by punishment and rewards. Whether this model will also be able to cope with more complex mental phenomena remains to be seen. But now, already, one can see that this model with its calculus of concepts o ers a rm explanation basis for such a n e n terprise 31].
Conclusions
Can machines think already at the present? An honest answer would be no, unfortunately, not yet, not in any i n teresting meaning of this word.
The good news is that we already have some clues of how the design of such m a c hines should be approached, as we h a ve seen in the paper.
The bad news is that even if we knew for sure how s u c h m a c hines should work, the next obstacle to be solved is their size. Namely, t h e h uman brain consists of about 10 12 neurons and about 10 15 dendrites. To s i m ulate each neuron separately would require computers with memory capacities of that order. In order to keep pace with the brain one parallel computational step requiring an update of each neuron would call for realizing still a substantially larger number (than 10 15 ) of operations per second. No parallel computer can do that. Interestingly, the total memory and computational capacity o f I n ternet seems to roughly correspond to the required task, if we forget about the speed: : : Some models seem to be less computationally demanding than others: it is here where the true computational abilities of real biological neurons can play a signi cant practical role. If de Bruijn is right in his speculations that the processing and memory capacity of the brain is also hidden at the molecular level, then a long way is to be expected before we arrive a t w orking models competing with human brains.
The next bad message is that when we insist on a human{like m a c hine intelligence machine learning should apparently take the form of education similar to that which we undergo during our lives. Providing a machine with respective inputs can turn out to be an insurmountable technical problem. For machines the most suitable source of knowledge is that in a textual form. The question whether one can build cognitive machines educated purely with the help of textual material is therefore of upmost interest. Such a m a c hine would then be inevitably crippled in its own perceiving experience and therefore could be hardly able to pass the Turing test. Nevertheless it can still be of enormous interest.
On the positive side, it can very well happen that we will discover ways of building and training true intelligent systems realized on computational models that are substantially di erent from neuron{based models and tailored to the possibilities of contemporary or foreseeable computing technologies. Even better (worse?), such s y stems might outperform our brains in cognitive abilities which is similar to the case that exists now in many application areas of computer science : : :
The most important lesson to be taken from the above described models of cognitive computing is perhaps the following one: although the respective models appear to be formally di erent, in fact, from the view point of their cognitive abilities they are not. Higher level issues of more elaborated models can be simulated on simpler models. This hopefully points to a certain robustness of the respective class of interactive cognitive machines and supports the original Turing claim that mental processes can be described in some kind of logical model and that discrete state machines are a relevant description of brain operations 8].
